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Abstract
We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose
sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff
over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in
pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by
introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence
by its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence being of infinite complexity) and
study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with
complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at
most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization
in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to
strategies with bounded recall.
Key words: Zero-sum games, periodic sequences, bounded recall, de Bruijn
graphs, oblivious strategy.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic decision theory models individual behavior by means of strategies, i.e. deci-
sion rules that adapt to the environment. In dynamic game models, the environment
is potentially controlled by a rational agent which may display unpredictable behav-
ior, out of strategic considerations. Therefore finding the optimal way to play or to
respond to a complex behavior of the opponent might be difficult in terms of compu-
tation and costly to implement. One may thus want to study strategies that optimally
plan the whole sequence of actions in a non-responsive way: these are called oblivious
strategies, i.e. strategies that do not rely on observation. Oblivious strategies ap-
pear in a variety of contexts in operations research, see e.g. Alon et al. (2002), Chung
et al. (2005), Dutta et al. (2002). This notion is also used in the literature on repeated
games with bouded rationality, see e.g. O’Connell and Stearns (2003), Neyman and
Okada (2005). Some papers study stochastic games played with oblivious strategies
and the corresponding equilibria, see e.g. Weintraub et al. (2005).
The aim of the present paper is to study oblivious strategies per se in the simplest
possible model of game. We consider a two-player zero-sum repeated game where each
player chooses his whole sequence of actions beforehand. The payoff is an average of
the sequence of payoffs generated by the joint sequence of actions. We call this the off-
line game. This is an extreme case of repeated game with imperfect monitoring where
players have no observation at all. We investigate this game played by boundedly
rational players.
The common assumption of perfectly rational agents has been questioned by sev-
eral papers in game theory and a whole literature was born, where players are subject
to some constraint in their ability to compute or to remember. Therefore only strate-
gies that are not computationally too demanding are available to them. Bounds on
players’ rationality can be expressed in different forms. For instance one stream of
literature considers games played by finite automata (see, e.g., Neyman (1985, 1998);
Rubinstein (1986); Abreu and Rubinstein (1988); Kalai and Stanford (1988); Ben-
Porath (1990, 1993); Neyman and Okada (2000b); Gossner and Herna´ndez (2003,
2006); Gossner et al. (2003); Bavly and Neyman (2005)). A partially different stream
of literature deals with games with bounded recall, i.e., games where players can re-
member only the most recent actions taken (see, e.g., Lehrer (1988, 1994); Sabourian
(1998); Gossner et al. (2003); Bavly and Neyman (2005); Renault et al. (2006)). Other
bounds on the complexity of the players have been considered, e.g., by Neyman and
Okada (1999, 2000a). This list is by no means exhaustive. Many of the existing
papers consider zero-sum games and study the effect of different restrictions in the
players’ rationality on the outcome of the game. Our paper goes in this direction and
studies two possible measures of complexity.
First we consider only periodic sequences and define the complexity of a sequence
as the length of its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence is viewed as infinitely
complex). This seems to be a natural notion of complexity to study as the usual
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ones, that is finite automata or bounded recall strategies, may only produce periodic
sequences. Moreover, this corresponds to the size of the smallest automaton which
is able to produce this sequence. To be more specific, a finite automaton (say for
player 1) in this game is a tuple (Q, q1, f, h) where Q is a finite nonempty set of
states, q1 ∈ Q is an initial state, f : Q → A is the action function and h : Q → Q
is the transition function. The difference with standard finite automata is that the
transition here depends only on the internal state of the automaton as it receives
no input from the opponent. The automaton then generates a sequence of actions
(xt)t≥1:
x1 = f(q1), q2 = h(q1), . . . , qt+1 = h(qt), xt+1 = f(qt+1),
and so on. Since the set of states is finite, the sequences of states and of actions
generated by the automaton are eventually periodic (periodic from some stage on)
with period of length no more than |Q| (the cardinality of Q). In the off-line game
with the limit of the mean payoff, the transient phase of the automaton is irrelevant:
given an eventually periodic sequence of actions for player 1, modifying finitely many
terms to make it periodic does not change the payoff. Moreover, any sequence of
actions with period n can be played by an automaton with n states. Our model may
thus be regarded as a special case of repeated game played by finite automata (with
trivial monitoring).
We study the maxmin value Vn,m of the off-line game played in pure strategies,
where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 to
strategies with complexity at most m. Our main result states that if player 1 has
complexity at most 2m and player 2 has complexity at most m, then player 1 can
guarantee the value in mixed strategies of the stage game, up to an error of order
1/m. When the stage game is “matching pennies”, we give a characterization of this
maxmin value as a function of the pair complexities (n, m).
The second complexity measure we consider is the size of the recall. A sequence
has recall k if each term of the sequence is given by a fixed function of the k previous
terms. This model is much more complicated to analyze than the previous one and
we give results for matching pennies only. Our main result in this part states that
one extra unit of recall ensures player 1 to guarantee a payoff close to the value of the
one-shot game (asymptotically when k is large): the advantage of having one extra
unit of memory does not vanish at the limit.
The proofs are based on some arithmetic arguments about periodic sequences. For
the model with bounded recall we use in addition some results on de Bruijn graphs
and sequences. These sequences have already appeared in some bounded rationality
models (see, e.g., Challet and Marsili (2000); Piccione and Rubinstein (2003); Liaw
and Liu (2005); Gossner and Herna´ndez (2006); Renault et al. (2006))
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deals
with games with periodic strategies. Section 4 studies games with bounded recall.
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2 Off-line games
We start with a finite zero-sum game G = (A,B, g) where A,B are nonempty finite
sets and g : A × B → R. Player 1 chooses a ∈ A, player 2 chooses b ∈ B and the
payoff g(a, b) is paid by player 2 to player 1.
In the associated off-line game Γ, player 1 chooses an A-valued infinite sequence
x = (xi)i≥1, player 2 chooses a B-valued infinite sequence y = (yi)i≥1, and the associ-
ated payoff is
γ(x, y) = lim
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi), (2.1)
where lim denotes a Banach limit, i.e. a linear mapping on the set of bounded
sequences such that lim inf ≤ lim ≤ lim sup. The use of a Banach limit (usual in
repeated games) will be immaterial in most of the paper since we shall deal mostly
with converging sequences.
We shall use the following notations throughout the paper. For a finite set A, we
let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions on A. We use the same symbol for the
multilinear extension of g, i.e., given a two finite sets A,B, a function g : A×B → R
and two distributions µ ∈ ∆(A), ν ∈ ∆(B), we define
g(µ, ν) =
∑
a
∑
b
µ(a)ν(b)g(a, b), (2.2)
and we shall identify the degenerate distribution at a point x with the point x itself.
We denote by val(G) the value of the game G = (A,B, g) in mixed strategies,
val(G) = max
µ∈∆(A)
min
b∈B
g(µ, b) = min
ν∈∆(B)
max
a∈A
g(a, ν),
by v(G) the maxmin in pure strategies,
v(G) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
g(a, b),
and by v(G) the minmax in pure strategies,
v(G) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
g(a, b).
For a nonempty finite set A, the set of A-valued sequences is denoted Aω. A
sequence x = (xt)t≥1 is n-periodic if xt+n = xt for each t. A sequence is periodic if it
is n-periodic for some n ≥ 1. The set of all periodic sequences is denoted by S(A).
For each x in S(A), we let per(x) be the smallest n such that x is n-periodic. For
each n ≥ 1, we let Sn(A) be the set of periodic sequences x such that per(x) ≤ n,
and we let S ′n(A) be the set of n-periodic sequences, i.e. all sequences x such that
per(x) divides n.
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Let ∆n(A) be the set of probability distributions which are fractional in n, that
is µ ∈ ∆n(A) if for every a ∈ A, the value nµ(a) is an integer (with an abuse of
notation we write µ(a) instead of µ({a})). An n-periodic sequence x induces an
empirical distribution µx ∈ ∆n(A), defined by:
µx(a) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{xi=a}.
3 Off-line games with periodic sequences
The main goal of the paper is to study the maxmin in pure strategies of the off-line
game when players are restricted to boundedly complex strategies. In this section
we measure the complexity of a strategy in the off-line game, i.e. of a sequence, by
its smallest period. A player with complexity n and action set A, may choose any
periodic sequence of actions with period at most n, thus any sequence in Sn(A). For
n, m ≥ 1 consider the quantity,
Vn,m(G) = max
x∈Sn(A)
min
y∈Sm(B)
γ(x, y),
which is the best payoff that player 1 can guarantee with a strategy of complexity
at most n, against a strategy of player 2 with complexity at most m. From this
definition, Vn,m(G) is non-decreasing in n and non-increasing in m.
3.1 Maxmin values in the off-line game
The off-line game Γ has generally no value in pure strategies:
sup
x∈Aω
inf
y∈Bω
γ(x, y) = v(G)
and,
inf
y∈Bω
sup
x∈Aω
γ(x, y) = v(G).
Indeed, if player 1 plays constantly an action a that maximizes minb∈B g(a, b) over
A, one has γ(x, y) ≥ v(G) for each y. On another hand, if we fix a sequence x of
player 1, player 2 may choose a sequence y such that for each stage t, yt minimizes
g(xt, b) over b ∈ B. Thus, supx∈Aω infy∈Bω γ(x, y) ≤ v(G).
Note that this implies that for each pair of complexities (n, m), Vn,m(G) ≥ v(G)
and if n ≤ m, then Vn,m(G) = v(G).
The value of Γ in mixed strategies clearly exists and equals val(G). Player 1 (resp.
player 2) guarantees val(G) by drawing an action at random according to an optimal
mixed strategy in G and playing constantly the selected action.
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Moreover, player 2 can defend the value of the game with constant strategies, i.e.
with complexity one. Formally, for each x ∈ Aω, there exists y ∈ S1(B) such that
γ(x, y) ≤ val(G). To see this, let x ∈ Aω. For each t ≥ 1 and a ∈ A define
µx,t(a) =
1
t
t∑
i=1
1{xi=a}
the empirical distribution induced by x up to stage t. For each y ∈ S1(B) constantly
equal to b we have
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi) = g(µx,t, b)
Let µx(a) = limt µx,t(a) the limit empirical distribution induced by x, where lim is a
Banach limit (the usual limit may not always exist). Since lim is linear, this defines
µ ∈ ∆(A) such that γ(x, y) = g(µ, b). If player 2 chooses b that minimizes g(µ, ·),
then γ(x, y) ≤ val(G).
Summing up, we get for each pair of complexities (n, m):
v(G) ≤ Vn,m(G) ≤ val(G). (3.1)
The next theorem states that the distance between V2m,m(G) and val(G) is of
order 1/m. This shows that, to guarantee the fully rational solution of the game,
here the value, player 1 needs only to be twice more complex than player 2.
Theorem 3.1. For each m ≥ 2,
val(G)−
‖G‖
m
≤ V2m,m(G) ≤ val(G),
where ‖G‖ := maxb
∑
a |g(a, b)|.
The key to this theorem is to prove that when player 1 chooses a sequence with
period n, player 2 has a best reply whose period divides n. In particular, when
player 1 chooses a sequence with a prime period, the best that player 2 can do is to
respond by a constant sequence. Hence, when player 2 has complexity m, player 1
with complexity 2m may choose a prime period p such that m < p < 2m and choose
a p-periodic sequence that guarantees the value of the stage game up to 1/p ≤ 1/m.
This method of proof suggests that Theorem 3.1 can by slightly improved as
follows. For each integer m, let pm be the smallest prime number such that pm > m,
one has:
val(G)−
‖G‖
m
≤ Vpm,m(G) ≤ val(G).
As m < pm < 2m, this generalizes Theorem 3.1. However, pm is asymptotically
smaller than 2m.
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We turn now to the formal proof of Theorem 3.1. We start by studying the problem
of computing a best reply of player 2 within Sm(B) against a periodic sequence x ∈
S(A). We fix a sequence x with per(x) = n, and an integer m. In the sequel we
let p = gcd(n, m) be the greatest common divisor of n and m, and q = lcm(n, m)
be the least common multiple of n and m. We consider the problem of finding an
m-periodic, B-valued sequence y that minimizes the average of g over a joint period
of (x, y), that is:
min
y∈S′m(B)
lim
t
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi) = min
y∈S′m(B)
1
q
q∑
i=1
g(xi, yi).
The n-periodic sequence x is the repetition of a word of length n with letters in
A, which is denoted x˜ = (x1, . . . , xn). Likewise, we write y˜ = (y1, . . . , ym). There
are two integers u, v such that q = un and q = vm, so that within a period of the
bivariate sequence (x, y), x˜ is repeated u times and y˜ is repeated v times. For each
j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we consider the xi’s that yj meets in the sequence (x, y), that is we
consider {xj+tm : t ∈ N}, and we look at the indices of these xi’s within a period of x.
For each integer t ∈ N, let [t]n be the smallest positive element of the class of t
modulo n, that is [t]n ∈ {1, . . . , n} and t − [t]n is a multiple of n. We let for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Tn,m,j = {[j + tm]n : t ∈ N}.
We also denote µx,m,j the empirical distribution induced by the set of xi’s met by yj,
that is,
µx,m,j(a) =
1
|Tn,m,j|
∑
i∈Tn,m,j
1{xi=a}. (3.2)
Hence, using notation (2.2),
1
q
q∑
i=1
g(xi, yi) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
g(µx,m,j, yj).
Therefore, to solve the minimization problem:
min
y∈S′m(B)
1
q
q∑
i=1
g(xi, yi),
one just has to choose yj that minimizes g(µx,m,j, b) over b ∈ B.
Lemma 3.2. For every sequence y ∈ S ′m(B), and every pair of indices j, j
′ ∈
{1, . . . , m}, we have:
[j]p = [j
′]p =⇒ Tn,m,j = Tn,m,j′,
with p = gcd(n, m).
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Proof. Assume [j]p = [j
′]p, i.e. j
′ = j + kp for some integer k. Let i ∈ Tn,m,j′. Then
there exists two integers s, t such that
i = j ′ + tm + sn = j + kp + tm + sn.
From Bezout’s identity (see e.g. Jones and Jones (1998)) there exist two integers c, d
such that p = cn + dm. It follows that
i = j + (kc + s)n + (kd + t)m,
and thus i ∈ Tn,m,j. The conclusion is obtained by symmetry.
Lemma 3.2 shows that if two letters in y˜ have the same rank modulo p = gcd(n, m),
then they meet the same set of letters of the sequence x. At optimum, these two letters
can be chosen to be the same and thus y can be chosen p-periodic.
Corollary 3.3. (a) For every x ∈ S(A), the problem
min
y∈S′m(B)
lim
t
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi)
has a solution y such that per(y) divides per(x).
(b) For every x ∈ S(A), the problem
min
y∈Sm(B)
lim
t
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi)
has a solution y such that per(y) divides per(x).
We may now prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given inequality (3.1), it is enough to prove that there exists
x ∈ S2m(A) such that, for each y ∈ Sm(B),
γ(x, y) ≥ val(G)−
‖G‖
m
.
Bertrand’s postulate, first proved by Chebyshev, states that for every integer
m ≥ 2, there exists a prime number p such that m < p < 2m (see e.g., Nagell
(1964)).
Let µ be an optimal mixed strategy for player 1 in G. There exists µp ∈ ∆p(A)
such that
‖µ− µp‖∞ := max
a
|µ(a)− µp(a)| ≤
1
p
.
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The mapping µ 7→ minb g(µ, b) is ‖G‖-Lipschitz, so that
min
b
g(µp, b) ≥ val(G)−
‖G‖
p
≥ val(G)−
‖G‖
m
.
There exists a sequence x such that per(x) = p and µx = µ
p. To show this, it is
enough to order the action set A = {a1, . . . , aK} and play in sequence a1, pµ
p(a1)
times, . . . , aK , pµ
p(aK) times. From Corollary 3.3, a best reply of player 2 , i.e. a
sequence that achieves miny∈Sm(B) γ(x, y), can be chosen such that per(y) divides p.
As p is prime, then per(y) = 1, that is y is constant (say equal to b) and γ(x, y) =
g(µp, b). Thus, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x, y) = minb g(µ
p, b) which completes the proof.
We use now the previous construction to prove that a fully rational player 1
guarantees val(G) with a pure strategy against every periodic sequence of player 2.
Proposition 3.4.
max
x∈Aω
min
y∈S(B)
γ(x, y) = val(G).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We construct x∗ ∈ Aω such that for each y ∈ S(B),
γ(x∗, y) ≥ val(G).
Let (pn)n denote the sequence of prime numbers. For each n, denote by xn ∈ A
pn a
word generating a sequence x with smallest period pn and µx = µ
pn where µpn is, as
above, a (1/pn)-approximation of an optimal mixed strategy of player 1. Such a word
was just constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The sequence x∗ is constructed by concatenating those words. For all n ≥ 1, call
superword and denote x˜n the repetition of xn, (pn − 1)! times. Then x˜n has length
Nn := (pn)!. Choose then a sequence of integers qn such that:
Nn+1
qnNn
→ 0, as n →∞. (3.3)
The sequence x∗ is such that x˜1 is repeated q1 times, x˜2 is repeated q2 times, . . ., x˜n
is repeated qn times, and so on.
Let y ∈ S(B) and set u = per(y). For n large enough, pn > u, hence u divides
pn!. Since x˜n has length pn!, the periodic repetition of x˜n and y have pn! as common
period. The average payoff over this period is thus the one yielded by y and the
periodic repetition of x˜n. Denote this payoff γ(x˜n, y). As pn is prime and pn > u, the
best payoff that y can achieve against x˜n is minb g(µ
pn, b). Thus,
γ(x˜n, y) ≥ val(G)−
‖G‖
pn
.
Consider now γk the average payoff yielded by the k-th superword against y. For
each k, there is nk such that γk = γ(x˜nk , y). (Since each superword is repeated many
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times, nk is only weakly increasing, e.g. for the first prime p1 = 2, the superblock
has two stages, thus n1 = n2 = 1; for the second prime p2 = 3, the superblock has
6 stages, thus n3 = n4 = n4 = n6 = 2, and so on.) One has lim inf γk ≥ val(G).
Condition (3.3) ensures that the length of a superword is negligible with respect to
the total length of what preceded it. Thus, the limit of the average payoff,
lim
1
t
t∑
i=1
g(xi, yi)
is the limit of a weighted average of the γk’s, which yields γ(x, y) ≥ val(G).
3.2 The matching pennies game
We give now a sharper result for the following matching pennies game, denoted G∗
in the sequel:
L R
T 1 0
B 0 1
. (3.4)
The value of this game is 1/2 and each player has a unique optimal mixed strategy
which is (1/2, 1/2). We get here a characterization of Vn,m(G
∗). For every pair of
integers n, m, let
P (n, m) = inf
{
p odd : p divides n, and
n
p
≤ m
}
and P (n, m) = +∞ if there is no such p.
For instance, if n ≤ m, then P (n, m) = 1. If m < n = 2k, then P (n, m) = +∞.
Theorem 3.5. For every pair of integers n, m,
Vn,m(G
∗)− val(G∗) =
−1
2 maxk≤n P (k, m)
.
Again we use the fact that when choosing his best reply, player 2 may choose a
period that divides the period n of player 1. The key argument is as follows. Assume
that n = pq with p odd, and that player 2 chooses a sequence with period q. Then
each letter of player 2 faces a distribution of actions of player 1 which is fractional in
p. Such a distribution must depart from the optimal strategy (1/2, 1/2) by at least
1/2p. We turn now to the formal proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Here A = {T, B} and B = {L, R}.
Clearly Sn(A) = ∪k≤nS
′
k(A) and
Vn,m(G
∗) = max
k≤n
max
x∈S′
k
(A)
min
y∈Sm(B)
γ(x, y).
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We shall prove that
wk,m := max
x∈S′
k
(A)
min
y∈Sm(B)
γ(x, y) =
1
2
−
1
2P (k, m)
.
If k ≤ m, this formula holds, as P (k, m) = 1 and wk,m = 0, since we can choose
y = x. From now on, assume k > m. We consider two cases.
Case 1: P (k, m) < +∞.
Set p = P (k, m) so that p is odd, divides k and
` :=
k
p
≤ m.
We first show that for every x in S ′k(A), there exists y in Sm(B) such that
γ(x, y) ≤
1
2
−
1
2p
. (3.5)
Let x in S ′k(A) and let y be an `-periodic sequence induced by the word y˜ =
(y1, . . . , y`). The joint period of (x, y) is then k, and the word y˜ is repeated p times.
Each yj meets thus p letters xi, and for each j, µx,`,j ∈ ∆p(A), where µx,`,j is defined
as in (3.2). One can thus choose y˜ such that
γ(x, y) =
1
`
∑`
j=1
min
b∈B
g(µx,`,j, b).
A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆p(A) has the form
µ = (µ(T ), µ(B)) =
(
q
p
,
p− q
p
)
,
with q ∈ {0, . . . , p}, and
min
b∈B
g(µ, b) = min(µ(T ), µ(B)).
Since p = 2d + 1 for some integer d, then for each q ∈ {0, . . . , p},
min
(
q
p
,
p− q
p
)
≤
d
p
=
1
2
−
1
2p
.
Therefore, for the chosen y, (3.5) holds.
We construct now x ∈ S ′k(A) such that for each y ∈ Sm(B),
γ(x, y) ≥
1
2
−
1
2p
.
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By definition p is an odd divisor of k, and as k > m, p > 1. We let k = `p for
some integer `, and p = 2d + 1 with d a positive integer. Let then x be the periodic
sequence generated by the word
x˜ = (x1, . . . , xk) = T . . . T︸ ︷︷ ︸
`d times
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(d+1) times
.
We claim that for this x, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x, y) is achieved by the sequence which is
constantly L and thus,
min
y∈Sm
γ(x, y) =
`d
k
=
d
p
.
Let y that achieves this minimum. From Corollary 3.3, we may assume that u :=
per(y) divides k, so there is an integer D such that k = Du. Since u ≤ m < k, we
have D ≥ 2. Let (y1, . . . , yu) be the word generating y, we claim that each letter yj
meets more B’s than T ’s so at optimum, each yj must be chosen equal to L.
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , u}, yj appears at stages j + tu, t = 0, . . . , D − 1. We just
need to check that less than half of these dates are before the time of the last T , i.e.
we check that,
|{t = 0, . . . , D − 1 : j + tu ≤ `d}| ≤
D
2
.
If j + tu ≤ `d, then tu < `d. Thus,
t <
`d
u
=
Dd
p
= D
d
2d + 1
<
D
2
,
which completes the proof if D is even.
If D is odd, D = 2c + 1 for some integer c and the definition of p implies D ≥ p
(minimality). If j + tu ≤ `d, then:
t < D
d
2d + 1
≤ D
c
2c + 1
=
D − 1
2
which completes the proof in this case.
Case 2: P (k, m) = ∞.
In this case k has the form k = p2j with p odd and j nonnegative integer such
that k/p = 2j > m. We need to prove that wk,m = 1/2. As wk,m ≤ 1/2, we prove
that there exists x ∈ S ′k(A) such that for each y ∈ Sm(B), γ(x, y) ≥ 1/2.
Consider then the sequence x with per(x) = 2j induced by the word of length 2j
T . . . T︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j−1 times
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j−1 times
.
Given this sequence x, miny∈Sm(B) γ(x, y) is achieved by y such that per(y) divides
2j, and since m < 2j, per(y) = 2` with ` ≤ j − 1. Thus the period of y divides 2j−1,
and each letter in y meets as many T ’s and B’s. Thus γ(x, y) = 1/2.
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The following is obtained directly from Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6. (a) If n ≤ m, then Vn,m(G
∗) = 0.
(b) For each N and m < 2N , V2N ,m(G
∗) = 1/2.
(c) For each m, V2m,m(G
∗) = 1/2.
Proof. (a) If n ≤ m, then for each k ≤ n, P (k, m) = 1. This follows thus from
Theorem 3.5.
(b) If n = 2N for some N , then n has no odd divisor other than 1. Hence, for m < n,
P (n, m) = +∞ and Vn,m(G
∗) = 1/2.
(c) For each m ≥ 1, there is a unique N ≥ 1 such that 2N−1 ≤ m < 2N and thus
m < 2N ≤ 2m. Therefore, maxk≤2m P (k, m) = +∞.
4 Off-line games with bounded recall
Another commonly used measure of complexity of strategies is the recall, that is the
number of past values of the sequence on which the next value depends.
Definition 4.1. Given an nonempty finite set A, a sequence x ∈ Aω has recall k ∈ N
if there exists a mapping f : Ak → A such that for each t > k, xt = f(xt−1, . . . , xt−k).
Such a sequence x is eventually periodic. As for automata, the transient phase
is irrelevant for our purposes, so we let Mk(A) be the set of periodic sequences with
recall k. For a sequence x ∈ Mk(A), we have per(x) ≤ |A|
k. However, there are
sequences with period |A|k which are not of recall k. Take for example the sequence
T . . . T︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k−1 times
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k−1 times
.
Although of period 2k, this sequence does not have recall k, otherwise the k last T ’s
should be followed by a T (assuming 2k−1 > k).
In this section we study the maxmin value of the off-line game where players are
restricted by the size of the recall
Wj,k(G) = max
x∈Mj(A)
min
y∈Mk(B)
γ(x, y).
4.1 Matching pennies with bounded recall
Since the analysis of off-line games with bounded recall is significantly more difficult,
we concentrate on the matching pennies game G∗ defined in (3.4). The proofs of our
result shall use the tools of the previous section and the theory of de Bruijn graphs
(see, e.g., de Bruijn (1946) and Yoeli (1962) for some properties of these graphs).
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Definition 4.2. A directed graph Dk called a de Bruijn graph if
• the set of vertices of Dk is {T, B}
k,
• there is an edge from x = (x1, . . . , xk) to y = (y1, . . . , yk) if and only if
(x2, . . . , xk) = (y1, . . . , yk−1).
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Figure 1. de Bruijn graph D3
Consider player 1 with recall k. The set of possible recalls for player 1 is {T, B}k. If
the recall is the word x ∈ {T, B}k at some stage, the recall at the next stage is obtained
by deleting the first letter of x and adding a new letter after x. If x = (x1, . . . , xk),
the next recall is either (x2, . . . , xk, T ) or (x2, . . . , xk, B). This defines a de Bruijn
graph.
A sequence with recall k (for player 1) can the be viewed as a cycle in the de Bruijn
graph Dk. Since Dk has 2
k vertices, the longest possible cycle has length 2k. Since
each vertex has as many outgoing as ingoing edges, such a cycle, called Hamiltonian
cycle, exists (see, e.g., Bolloba´s (1998)). The associated sequence of T s an Bs is
called a de Bruijn sequence. A cycle of length 1 also exists (associated to the constant
sequence TTT . . .), but, more generally, the following proposition (Yoeli (1962)) states
that every length cycle is possible (see Lempel (1971) for a generalization to any finite
alphabet).
Proposition 4.3. For every p in {1, . . . , 2k}, there exists a cycle with length p in the
de Bruijn graph Dk.
The next lemma provides results similar to those obtained for automata.
Lemma 4.4. (a) For every pair of integers (j, k), 0 ≤ Wj,k(G
∗) ≤ 1/2.
(b) If j ≤ k, Wj,k(G
∗) = 0.
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(c) For every k, W2k,k(G
∗) = 1/2.
In Corollary 3.6 (c) player 1 can induce a period whose maximum length is twice
the maximum length of the period induced by player 2. In Lemma 4.4 (c) player 1’s
maximum possible period is of length 2(2
k), which is exponentially larger than the
length of player 2’s maximum possible period 2k. Hence here, in accordance with
known results on zero-sum games with bounded complexity (see Lehrer (1988), Ben-
Porath (1993)), if player 1 is exponentially more complex than player 2, then she
behaves like a fully rational player.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. (a) This is similar to inequality (3.1). Player 1 guarantees 0
with the constant sequence T , thus with recall zero. Player 2 defends val(G∗) with a
constant strategy, thus again with recall zero.
(b) If player 2 has the largest recall, he can use the same sequences as player 1 and
can defend 0 at every stage.
(c) If j = 2k, player 1 can choose the 2k+1-periodic sequence x whose cycle is
T . . . T︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k times
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k times
.
Note that such x has indeed recall 2k. Each sequence y ∈ Mk has period per(y) ≤
2k < per(x). As in the proof of Case 2 of Theorem 3.5 (with p = 1), for each such y,
γ(x, y) = 1/2.
The main concern of this section is the study of Wk+1,k(G
∗).
Theorem 4.5. (a) W1,0(G
∗) = W2,1(G
∗) = 1/2, W3,2(G
∗) = 3/7,
(b) limk Wk+1,k(G
∗) = 1/2.
Point (a) may suggest that the sequence Wk+1,k(G
∗) decreases away from 1/2, the
intuition being that the advantage of having one extra slot of recall vanishes as k
grows. Point (b) shows that it is not so.
Piccione and Rubinstein (2003, Section 5, Footnote 5) noticed that if player 1
plays a de Bruijn sequence of recall k + 1, then player 2 with recall k must “have a
frequency of mistakes of at least 1/(2(k + 1)).” This statement implies that
Wk+1,k(G
∗) ≥
1
2(k + 1)
.
Theorem 4.5 states that for large values of k, if player 1 has recall k + 1 and
player 2 has recall k, player 1 can induce a frequency of mistakes close to 1/2.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. (a) Applying point c of Lemma 4.4 for k = 0 and k = 1 gives
W1,0(G
∗) = W2,1(G
∗) = 1/2. We prove now that W3,2(G
∗) = 3/7. We first show that
W3,2(G
∗) ≥ 3/7.
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Let x be the 3-recall strategy for player 1 that plays the 7-periodic sequence
TTTBBTB TTTBBTB . . . . Any strategy y with recall 2 for player 2 has a period
per(y) ≤ 4 = 22. From Corollary 3.3, the best sequence for player 2 can be chosen
with a period that divides 7, thus with period 1. As the proportions of T ’s and B’s
are respectively 4/7 and 3/7, the best payoff that player 2 can get is 3/7.
We prove now W3,2(G
∗) ≤ 3/7 by checking that for each 3-recall strategy x, there
exists a 2-recall strategy y such that γ(x, y) ≤ 3/7. We discuss on p = per(x), the
period of x.
If p = 1, p = 2 or p = 4, x is indeed a 2-recall sequence: if p = 1 this is a constant
sequence, if p = 2, up to circular permuations this is the sequence TBTB · · · , and
if p = 4 this is the sequence TTBBTTBB · · · (again up to circular permutations).
Thus, in each of these case, there exists y such that γ(x, y) = 0.
If p ∈ {3, 5, 7}, as these are prime numbers, the best y is constant (Corollary 3.3).
By choosing the less frequent action, player 2 ensure that the payoff is no more that
1
2
− 1
2p
≤ 3/7 for p ∈ {3, 5, 7}.
If p = 8, up to circular permutations and symmetry between T and B, there is
only one 8-periodic sequence with recall 3 which is the de Bruijn sequence,
BBBTBTTT BBBTBTTT . . . .
Then, player 2 with recall 2 may play the 4-periodic sequence LLRR LLRR. . . . The
payoff is here 2/8 = 1/4 < 3/7.
Lastly assume p = 6. We first rule out the 6-periodic sequences that display
different numbers of T ’s and B’s. Assume that the number of B’s is greater than the
number of T ’s and call q this number. Then q < 3 and player 2 by playing R gets
q
6
< 3/7. If the number of T ’s and B’s are equal, we enumerate all possible sequences
for player 1, i.e. we enumerate all periods of length 6 containing 3 T ’s and 3 B’s.
Assume w.l.o.g. that the first element of the period is T . The periods of player 1
are ordered lexicographically (with T preceding B). Nine cases are possible (how to
select 2 stages among 5 for the last 2 T ), ruling out the 2-periodic sequences. In each
case a periodic sequence of player 2 with recall 2 that gives a payoff lower than 3
7
is
displayed.
case number 1 2 3 4 5
period P1 TTTBBB TTBTBB TTBBTB TTBBBT TBTTBB
sequence P2 RLRLRL LRLRLR RLRLRL LRLRLR RLRLRL
payoff 2/6 2/6 2/6 2/6 2/6
case number 6 7 8 9
period P1 TBTBBT TBBTTB TBBTBT TBBBTT
sequence P2 RLRLRL RLRLRL LRLRLR RLRLRL
payoff 2/6 2/6 2/6 2/6
In each case, the payoff is 2/6 < 3/7.
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(b) By Bertrand’s postulate, for each k there exists a prime number p such that
2k < p < 2k+1. By Proposition 4.3, there exists a p-periodic sequence of T ’s and B’s
that corresponds to a strategy with recall k + 1. This defines x in Mk+1(A). As p
is prime, the best sequence that player 2 may choose among S2k(B) and thus among
Mk(B) is a constant sequence.
Let T (x) and B(x) be the respective numbers of T ’s and B’s in a cycle of x, so
that
µx =
(
T (x)
p
,
B(x)
p
)
.
The best payoff that player 2 can get is
min
(
T (x)
p
,
B(x)
p
)
,
and we just need to check that it is close to 1/2 when k is large. We assume w.l.o.g.
T (x) ≥ B(x) and evaluate B(x).
For each i ≥ k +2, denote by ui = (xi−1, . . . , xi−(k+1)) the recall of player 1 before
stage i, and denote by B(ui) = |{j ∈ {i− (k + 1), . . . , i− 1}, xj = B}| the number of
B’s appearing in ui. The sequence (ui)i≥k+2 is periodic with period p, and
1
p
B(x) =
1
p
|{i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, xi = B}| =
1
p
(
k+1+p∑
i=k+2
1
k + 1
B(ui)
)
.
The point is that uk+2, uk+3, . . . , up+k+1 are distinct elements of {T, B}
k+1, and p > 2k,
so more than half of the words in {T, B}k+1 appear in this average.
• Assume first k even: k = 2a, with a in N. Then half of the words in {T, B}k+1
contain more T ’s than B’s, and we get a lower bound by selecting the p elements with
fewer B’s. Better, we consider even less elements by taking average over the 2k = 22a
elements with less B’s than T ’s. So
B(x)
p
>
1
22a
a∑
`=0
`
2a + 1
(
2a + 1
`
)
=: F (a).
Since,
a∑
`=0
`
(
2a + 1
`
)
= (2a + 1)
a∑
l=1
(2a)!
(`− 1)! (2a + 1− `)!
= (2a + 1)
a∑
`=1
(
2a
`− 1
)
= (2a + 1)
a−1∑
`=0
(
2a
`
)
= (2a + 1)
(
22a−1 −
1
2
(
2a
a
))
,
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then
F (a) = 1/2−
1
22a+1
(
2a
a
)
.
So for k even,
B(x)
p
> F (a) = 1/2−
1
22a+1
(
2a
a
)
.
• Assume now that k = 2a + 1 is odd. Proceeding the same way,
B(x)
p
>
1
22a+1(2a + 2)
(
a∑
`=0
`
(
2a + 2
`
)
+
1
2
(a + 1)
(
2a + 2
a + 1
))
,
and the right-hand side of this inequality is nothing but
1
2
+
1
22a+3
(
2a + 2
a + 1
)
−
1
22a+1
(
2a + 1
a
)
.
Hence,
B(x)
p
≥
1
2
−
1
22a+1
(
2a + 1
a
)
.
The proof is completed by noticing that both
1
22a
(
2a
a
)
and
1
22a+1
(
2a + 1
a
)
go to zero as a goes to infinity.
4.2 Same recall, more actions
To conclude the paper, we present an example showing that, in games with bounded
recall, the complexity of the player may not be conveniently measured by the size of
her recall. Consider the following game G∗∗. It is a variation of matching pennies
where each action of player 1 is duplicated.
L R
T1 1 0
T2 1 0
B1 0 1
B2 0 1
Proposition 4.6. Wk,k(G
∗∗) = 1/2 for each k ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. With recall k, player 1 can play the following 2k+1-periodic
sequence: first play a de Bruijn sequence on the alphabet {T1, T2} (of length 2
k)
followed by a de Bruijn sequence on the alphabet {B1, B2}. With recall k, player 2
cannot produce a period greater than 2k, and as the best reply has a period that
divides 2k+1, player 2 cannot get more than 1/2.
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Proposition 4.6 suggests that the actual power of player 1 with recall k depends
on her number of actions.
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